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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM J. COLMAN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
A. J. BUTKOVICH and GENEVA 
A. BUTKOVICH, Husband and wife; 
G. W. ANDERSON, and J E A N N E 
D. BANKS, and all unknown persons 
who claim any interest in the subject 
matter of this action, 
Defendants-Appellants 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF 
N A T U R E OF T H E CASE 
Plaintiff sued to quiet title to a parcel of property 
located in Park City, Utah, claiming ownership and 
that the tax title of Defendants was a nullity. The de-
fendants Butkovich answered claiming title superior to 
plaintiff's to all but a small part of the property claimed 
by plaintiff. 
D I S P O S I T I O N IN T H E L O W E R COURT 
After trial, the lower court entered a decree quiet-
ing title to the property in plaintiff based on findings 
Case No. 
13868 
I 
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that plaintiff had color of title and that the tax deeds 
from Summit County were void because the descrip-
tions of the land were fatally defective. The lower court 
denied a motion to amend the findings of fact and con-
clusions of law and to alter the judgment filed by de-
fendants. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to have the decree 
quieting title in him sustained by this Court. 
S T A T E M E N T O F FACTS 
The defendants Butkovich obtained their title to 
the property by two quit-claim deeds from Summit 
County on July 9, 1964, and April 15, 1965. Summit 
County had previously, in 1915 and 1940, obtained title 
by Auditor's Tax Deeds resulting from tax sales in 
1910 and 1935. The deeds from the County were in 
customary form,, except that the legal descriptions were 
void for uncertainty. 
The description in the first Summit County Deed 
to the Butkovichs. dated July 6, 1974, read, 
"All unplatted land in Block 29, and also land 
West of Block 29 and lots I and A. PC 364". 
Thereafter correctory deed was given by Summit 
County to the Butkovichs, dated April 15, 1965 which 
read, 
"All unplatted land in this Block (29 PC) 
2 
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and all land West of this Blk. and Pt. lot 1: Pt. 
lot A." 
These are the sole conveyances out of Summit 
County upon which the Butkovich tax title is predicated. 
On February 15, 1966, Mr. and Mrs. Butkovich 
executed and delivered to Security Title Company a 
Warranty Deed for lands in Block 29, Park City Survey 
somewhat similar to the description in the April, 1965 
correctory deed and followed it by a metes and bounds 
description supplied by Mr. Butkovich. The same day, 
Security Title Company executed and delivered back 
to Mr. and Mrs. Butkovich "as joint tenants", the 
identical property. The metes and bounds description 
is that shown on page 7 of appellants' brief. That brief 
erroneously implies that such is a part of the correction 
deed from Summit County (Entry 58 of abstract, Exh. 
11A). That description did not appear until Mr. But-
kovich delivered it in 1966 to Security Title Company 
for preparation of the two deeds. He said that such 
(Exh. 5) was prepared by Mr. Raymond L. Griffith, 
(Tr. 68) a surveyor for Mountain Fuel Supply Com-
pany. However, Mr. Griffith denied that he had pre-
pared it or given it to Mr. Butkovich. (Tr. 109) 
Both Plaintiff and the Defendants Butkovich had 
paid taxes on the property. On the issue of possession, 
neither had fenced, cultivated or occupied the land (a 
hillside in the Park City area) and the trial Judge 
found, No. 4 (R. 155) that 'There is no evidence that 
3 
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either of the parties has had exclusive possession of the 
property or has actively occupied, cultivated, fenced 
or otherwise used the property, except in a very casual 
manner." 
Plaintiff's title to the involved land came by a 
Warranty Deed dated November 12, 1968 from Robert 
TV Banks, as Trustee and individually, describing: 
"All that part of the N W 1/4 of the SE .1/4 
of Section 16, Twp 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, that lies Westerly of 
Norfolk Avenue." 
As reflected by the abstract of title, Exh. 11 A, 
that property had been vested in 1916 in The Assets 
Corporation and in Park City Townsite. Neither had 
conveyed out after that date and no other title claimant 
appears of record from 1916 until the 1968 Warranty 
Deed to Plaintiff. Along with that deed was recorded 
the Affidavit of Robert T. Banks explaining the ex-
piration of the two title holding corporations and his 
authorization to sell. H e conveyed as Trustee and indi-
vidually. 
Mr. Robert B. Jones, is a Utah licensed land sur-
veyor employed by Bush and Gudgell (Ti\ 16). H e 
has made 400 to 500 surveys in the Park City area and 
did one on this property (Exh. 8). H e was later asked 
about the possibility of platting, locating or surveying 
the descriptions contained in the two deeds from Summit 
4 ' 
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County to the Butkovichs, which read, 1964, "All un-
platted land in Block 29 and also land west of Block 
29:" and in 1965, "also land west of Block 29". To both 
of these enquiries he answered in the negative (Tr. 28). 
However, as to the Plaintiff's description, such was 
locatable as it is encompassed within the legal quarter 
isection description. Defendants presented no evidence to 
disprove such testimony. 
Judge Sorensen, after hearing the evidence, seeing 
the demeanor of the witnesses and considering the mem-
oranda submitted by the parties, issued his Memorandum 
Decision (R. 152) as follows: 
"The court concludes that, as between the 
parties, plaintiff holds color of title. The court 
further concludes that the tax title held by defen-
dants is void from its inception. See Edwards 
v. City of Santa Paula, 292 P.2d 31, Meyercort 
v. Warrington, 19 So.2d 433, and Burton v. 
Hoover, 93 Utah 498. 
The statute of limitations is therefore not ap-
plicable, and title is ordered quieted in plaintiff." 
A R G U M E N T 
T H E 1964 A N D 1965 D E E D S FROM SUM-
M I T COUNTY W E R E A N U L L I T Y A S TO 
T H I S P R O P E R T Y — VOID B E C A U S E OF TO-
T A L L Y D E F E C T I V E D E S C R I P T I O N AND 
5 
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P L A I N T I F F IS NOT B A R R E D BY S T A T U T E 
OF L I M I T A T I O N S . 
The law in Utah and generally is that a legal des-
cription must be adequate to identify the property if a 
conveyance is to be effective. This applies to tax deeds 
as well as to ordinary conveyances. Let us cite the three 
cases identified in Judge Sorensens Memorandum De-
cision. The critical issue is the sufficiency of the por-
tions of the two tax deeds from Summit County: 
1964 .. . . . "also land West of Block 29". 
1965 . . . . "all land West of this Block." (29PC) 
In Edwards v. City of Santa Paula, Calif. 1956, 292 
P.2d 31, the issues in the quiet title suit revolved around 
a tax sale and deed referring to certain lots in "Block 
68 Subdivision". There was no Block 68 Subdivision of 
record in the Recorder's Office. In the decision holding 
that the fee title owner would have been barred by the 
statute of limitations, except for the fact tha the des-
cription in the deed was fatally defective, the Court 
said in part: 
"To be sufficient the description must be such 
that the land can be identified or located on the 
ground by use of the same. Best. v. Wohlford, 
144 Cal. 733, 736, 78 P. 293. Parol evidence is 
, always admissible in aid of application of the 
description to its subject matter, but not for the 
purpose of completing a description which is 
inherently not susceptible of application to the 
ground." 
6 
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'"There are no presumptions or intendments 
in favor of the description of a tax deed. Sinai v. 
Mul, 80 Cal. App.2d 277, 280, 181 P.2d; Harvey 
v. Meyer, 117 Cal. 60, 64, 48, P . 1014. The in-
tention of the assessor or grantor (state) is not 
a proper subject of inquiry for the proceeding is 
in invitum, the property owner has no intention 
which enters into the deed, he may stand upon its 
insufficiency, and the taxing agency or the state 
must adhere to settled basic rules in describing 
the property or the deed will be void." 
Meyerkort v. Warrington (Mississippi), 1944, 19 
So. 2d. 433. A tax sale was conducted in which the lands 
were described as part of certain sections: 
"This alleged tax sale, as well as the assess-
ments upon which it was based, was utterly void 
for want of description. The pretended descrip-
tions were as follows: 
T t . Sec. 28 Tp. 12 R. 3 E, 5 acres,' and T t . 
Sec. 29 Tp. 12 R 12 E, 100 acres,' and T t . Sec. 
30 Tp. 12 R 12 E, 29 acres,' and the other four 
descriptions were in like terms. That such an at-
tempted description is no description whatever 
and that a tax deed containing (he nullity is no 
deed at all has been settled in several of our 
cases, among which are Cogburn v. Hunt, 54 
Miss. 676, and Tierney v. Brown, 65 Miss. 563, 
5 So. 104, 7 Am. St. Rep. 679." 
"Appellees' third contention is that appellants, 
the Meyerkorts, are barred by Chapter 196, Laws 
1934, Sec. 717, Code 1942, because suit was not 
brought within two years after April 4, 1934, the 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
;,;:•;.- efective date of that Act. The sale to the State 
being utterly void for want of description, there 
was no tax deed to the land here in question, 
wherefore the cited statute does not apply, nor 
does any other such statute, save the ten-year 
statute of adverse possession, and this only to the 
_ lands actually occupied, and not to the calls of 
the deed; for in a tax paper such as in this case 
: ; there are no calls. We pursue this issue no further 
than to cite Pearce v. Perkins, 70 Miss. 276, 12 
So. 205, and Patterson v; Morgan, 161 Miss. 807, 
138 So. 362—statutes of limitation do not run in 
favor of the holder of a tax deed void on its face. 
61 C.J. p. 1427." 
Thus, in this case, it was held that the descriptions 
in the tax deed were void, hence the statute of limita-
tions would riot be initiated nor run against the owner. 
The Utah case cited is Burton v. Hoover, 1937, 93 
Utah 498, 74 Pac. 2d 652. This involved a quiet title 
procedure on lands in Wasatch County. The tax title 
was based upon a purported description of lands, "Sec. 
7-5-4" and 'Sec. 18-5-4". The Court held that notwith-
standing the legislative authorization for abbreviations 
(Sect. 80-1-6 R.S. Utah 1933, now Sec. 59-1-6 U.C.A. 
1953) the tax deed was void as no realty was described 
as the township and range were not indicated. Citations 
were given of like matters and that such are "confusing 
in the extreme, and intolerable when employed as a 
means by which to divest title to real estate without the 
consent of the owner". 
"And the omission to designate whether the 
S 
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range is east or west, and the township north or 
south, is likewise held fatal. Wilson v. Jarron, 23 
Idaho 563, 131 P.12; Sears v. Murdock, 59 Or. 
211, 117 P. 305; Noble v. Watrous, supra. The 
first requisite in a description of real property 
is a definite basic starting point, which is entirely 
lacking when, as here, the description fails to 
indicate any township or range, or, if that were 
indicated, whether north or south, or east or west, 
or even from which of two meridians the land is 
to be located.' 
In Utah we have another decision that touches upon 
this issue, namely Ferguson v. Mathis, 96 Utah 442, 85 
P.2d 827. There the court construed the validity of a 
tax deed identifying Lot 15 of Highland Park "Sub-
division", and held that the use of the word "addition" 
in place of "subdivision" was not a fatal defect. A gen-
eral statement of the law in Utah is found at page 828 as 
follows: 
"Was then the description of the property in 
the tax sale proceedings so indefinite or errone-
ous as to invalidate such proceedings ? The Courts 
have consistently he'd that if a description in tax 
proceedings is too vague, too indefinite, to notify 
the owned that it is his property that is being 
tawed, and insufficient to inform prospective 
purchasers a to what property is to be sold, the 
resulting taw title after sale is void" (underling 
ours) 
Olsen v. Bagley, 10 Utah 492, 37 P. 739; 
Tintic Undine Mining Company v. Ercanbrack, 
et al., 93 Utah 561, 74 P.2d 1184." 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A very extensive annotation of the law relating to 
ambiguities in descriptions of lands in deeds and whether 
parol evidence may be submitted to explain such ambi-
guities, is found in 68 A.L.R. 4-105. At page 65 is a 
discussion of ambiguous descriptions in deeds executed 
at judicial sales. I t is stated there that the courts have 
usually applied a stricter rule of construction in case of a 
deed executed at a judicial sale, such as tax deeds, than 
in the case of a deed between individuals. 
An extensive annotation is in 133 A.L.R. 570 which 
deals with the applicability of specific statutes of limi-
tations relating to tax titles. The summary of the hold-
ings as made by the editor of the annotation is as follows: 
"Where the description in a tax assessment or 
• t a x deed does not describe the property pur-
ported to have been sold for taxes, or the descrip-
tion thereof is so vague, uncertain or erroneous 
that the property in question cannot be identified, 
it has been held or stated that limitation periods 
provided for the purpose of barring attacks on 
tax sales are not applicable to protect tax titles 
based thereon.'' 
A reading of the cases cited in the annotation re-
veals that descriptions far more comprehensive than the 
one involved here have been held to be patently insuf-
ficient, and as a result the tax deed void and the statute 
of limitations inapplicable. 
The fatal defect in the two deeds from Summit 
10 
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County to the Butkovich is that the conflict with Plain-
tiff's property would be based upon, if at all, the des-
criptions, "also land West of Block", No perimeter of 
the parcel is given. Does it run westerly to the Pacific 
Ocean, to the West line of Utah, Summit County or to 
the summit of the next mountain"? The fatal uncertainty 
of this was testified to by the licensed surveyor, Mr. 
Jones (supra) when he said that he could not survey or 
locate such a tract. 
In consequence, the Butkovichs acquired no right, 
title or interest in property adverse to Plaintiff. There 
is no basis for attempting by speculation to clarify this 
void description by use of parol evidence. In any event, 
no official of Summit County was called to explain that 
verbiage. In Davidson v, Robbins, 30 Utah 2d 338, 517 
P.2d 1026, your Court held that parol evidence is ad-
misible to apply, but not to supply, a description of lands 
in a contract. That decision can give no comfort to ap-
pellants in this case. 
W e are not unmindful that the Utah Legislature 
strove mightily to cloak tax titles with a mantle of 
strength. The enactment of the sections relating to the 
statutes of limitations were for that very purpose. Ap-
pellants point to Section 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2, 
U.C.A. 1953, as amended, to claim that Plaintiff's cause 
of action is barred. They say that more than four years 
had pased from the date of the first tax deed on July 6, 
1964, until filing of this action on June 24, 1971. Sec-
u 
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tion 78-12-5.1 is the seven year statute and 78-12-5.2 is 
the four year statute. The thrust of the Appellant's 
position is that Plaintiff was not in possession as re-
quired by said two sections. 
Had the Butkovichs acquired prim^a facie valid title 
to the involved property by the deeds from Summit 
County, some merit would be conceded for the assertion 
of that position. However, where the tax title as to these 
lands is fatally defective because the same does not de-
scribe the realty, then the tax title statute of limitations 
cannot be asserted. 
I I . 
D E F E N D A N T S , B U T K O V I C H , C R E A T E D 
N O T H I N G BY T H E 1966 D E E D E X C H A N G E 
W I T H M E T E S A N D BOUNDS D E S C R I P -
TIONS. 
The complete inadequacy of the Butkovichs' tax 
deed must have been realized by him shortly after the 
1964 deed as he applied to Summit County for a cor-
rectory deed in 1965. This was basically a change of the 
word "also" to "all" and in no way placed any dimen-
sions or perimeter to the land "west of said Block". Mr. 
Butkovich testified that later he went to Security Title 
Company and was told he must get a "proper description 
on it" and could not even then insure it until five years 
had passed. (Tr. 68). Then he brought to Security Title 
Gompay a legal description from which was prepared a 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Warranty Deed from the Butkovichs to Security Title 
and a Quit-Claim Deed to the Butkovichs as joint ten-
ants from Security Title (Exhs. P-3 and P-4 respec-
tively) both dated February 15, 1966. These were re-
corded February 23, 1966. 
No one has advised the Court of the origin of the 
metes and bounds description supplied by Mr. Butkovich 
for the deeds. The surveyor denied creating such. He 
had good reason for doing so, as it not only encompasses 
land owned by Mr. Colman (plaintiff herein) but sever-
al residences which are not owned or claimed by any of 
the parties hereto. It appears to be an irresponsible and 
reckless attempt by a wild description to initiate a title 
where none previously existed. 
This is the first time that the Butkovichs appear of 
record to have any asserted interest in the involved 
lands. However, this was sort of a "bootstrap operation" 
whereby the Butkovichs tried to assert an interest by 
creating it through their own deed to Security Title. 
Prior to that time, they had no interest as the two Sum-
mi County deeds did not have a valid legal description 
which could be platted, surveyed or possessed. This fact 
was known to the Butkovichs as evidenced by the refusal 
of Security Title to insure and requiring that Mr. Butko-
vich get a legal description, exchange deeds and then 
wait for five years. 
We observe that the Appellants cite the case of 
13 
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Peterson v.Callister, 6 Utah 2d 359, 313 P.2d 814. Here 
a tax title was being litigated and the four year statute 
(Sect. 78-12-5.1, U.C.A. 1953) was asserted. The 
Court's decision affirmed the purpose of that statute as 
one of repose "after another has received a tax title 
valid on its face", (emphasis ours). That is the problem 
which Mr. Butkovich was trying to overcome. His tax 
deed was not valid on on its face. H e recognized it. 
Security Title recognized it. In an apparent effort to 
be helpful, he was told to bring in a valid legal descrip^ 
tion, exchange deeds, record them and then wait for five 
years. No greater confirmation of the invalidity of the 
two deeds from Summit County could be asked. 
P L A I N T I F F H A S COLOR OF T I T L E TO 
T H E P R O P E R T Y 
IV. 
D E C R E E Q U I E T I N G T I T L E IN P L A I N -
T I F F I S P R O P E R AND S H O U L D BE A F -
F I R M E D . 
The evidence of Plaintiff's title is direct and is 
shown by Exh. 1-A which reflects that title was in Park 
City Townsite (a corporation) by a Sheriff's deed 
November 21, 1916, and in The Asets Corporation by a 
deed from Michigan Trust Company dated December 
. : 14 ; ' " " - - - ' • • " • • ' • - : ; 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28, 1916. No recorded conveyances appear from either 
corporation since 1916. In 1968 we find the recorded 
Affidavit of Robert T. Banks which fully explains how 
he became the Trustee and owner of such assets in these 
two inactive corporations. The final step is the Novem-
ber 12, 1968, warranty deed from Robert T. Banks "as 
Trustee and individually" to William J. Colman, Plain-
tiff and Respondent herein. ~ 
This established in the record of this case prima 
facie evidence of title in plaintiff, William J . Colman. 
Judge Sorensen enquired as to the "quality of title" 
essential to enable judgment to be rendered in favor of 
the plaintiff in this proceeding. With over 52 years of 
continuous uninterrupted title in the corporations, 1916 
to 1968, a clear "root of title" was proven within the 
intent and purpose of Chapter 9, Title 57, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, relating to Marketable Record Title. 
That is the "unbroken chain of title of record to any 
interest in land for forty years", as defined by Section 
57-9-1. 
The adoption of this Chapter by the Legislature of 
Utah was an effort to wipe out old concepts of absolute 
marketability and to relate the issue to a more recent 
period of time (40 years). This pattern has now been 
adopted by many states as a necessity, as chains of title 
grow longer and longer (this one started in 1877 by 
U.S. Patent). In recognition of the newness of the 
approach, our Legislature gave a guide to the Courts 
15 
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of Utah for interpretation. Section 57-9-9, U.C.A, 1953, 
as amended, reads, 
"This, act shall be liberally construed to effect 
the legislative purpose of simplifying and facili-
tating land title transactions. . .' 
The Utah State Bar Association likewise took steps 
in aid of such interpretation and the fundamental pur-
pose of placing at rest old land title defects and facilita-
ting current land transactions. Having in mind the 52 
years, 1916 to 1968, let us consider the impact and guid-
ance in the Title Standards of the Utah State Bar. 
Standards 46 through 56 deal with various phrases of 
the Marketable Title Act. Standard 47 refers to "a con-
nected series of conveyances or other title transactions of 
public record in which the root of title has been a matter 
of public record for at least forty years." (underlining 
is ours). 
Mr. Colman's title has such a root, going back to 
1916. I t seems significant that the Standard uses the 
phrase "or other title transactions" (taken from Section 
57-9-1 of the statute) in addition to the reference to 
"conveyance". This is a clear recognition that the cura-
tive purposes of this wise legislative step might involve 
the application of liberal interpretation to other docu-
ments. The combination of the Affidavit and the War-
ranty Deed in 1968 by Robert T. Banks is such "other 
title transaction" of significant import to transfer title 
to M7 'olman. We note that he warranty deed to Mr. 
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Colman is by Mr. Banks "as Trustee" as well as in an 
individual capacity. The concurrent Affidavit, read 
along with the warranty deed, show that he was endea-
voring to pass the complete title of The Assets Corpora-
tion and Park City Townsite Company to Mr. Colman. 
Had we the task of drafting the deeds now, perhaps 
more exact words of art might have been employed. Mr. 
Banks is deceased now, so we cannot go back to a cor-
rectory deed. 
Title Standard 48 refers to the language of "pur-
porting to divest", as found in Section 57-9-1(2) of the 
statute. The two deeds in 1916, one from the Sheriff to 
Park City Townsite Company and one from The Mich-
igan Trust Company to The Assets Corporation, cer-
tainly purported to divest title. The Sheriff's Deed 
described the Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quar-
ter of Section 16, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, 
Salt Lake Meridian, which is the property at issue. The 
other deed was more general. Now the next conveyance 
in 1968 to Mr. Colman is a Warranty Deed by Mr. 
Banks "as Trustee and individually", and such certainly 
divests all title which grantor had, both as Trustee for 
the record title owners and individually. Section 57-1-12 
relating to Warranty Deeds says: 
"Such deed when executed as required by law 
shall have the effect of a conveyance in fee simple 
to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of the pre-
mises therein named, together with all the ap-
purtenances, rights and privileges thereunto be-
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longing, with covenants from the grantor, his 
heirs and personal representatives, that he is law-
fully seized of the premises; that he has good 
right to convey the same; that he guarantees the 
grantee, his heirs and assigns in the quiet pos-
session thereof; that the premises are free from 
all encumbrances; and that the grantor, his heirs 
and personal representatives will forever warrant 
and defend the title thereof in the grantee, his 
heirs and assigns against all lawful-claims what-
soever." 
In Title Standard No. 48 we find the following 
language: "A recorded instrument may also purport to 
divest even though there is not a complete chain or 
record title connecting the grantee in the divesting in-
strument with the forty year chain.*' At the trial some 
reference was tossed out that the Banks to Colman was a 
"wild deed". Such is not a fact, as Mr. Banks warranted 
the property as "Trustee" as well as individually. This 
makes the conveyance a valid and enforceable transfer 
and not merely an act of a interloper in the title. The 
Affidavit under oath is a recorded document under the 
Marketable Title Act and must be considered, particu-
larly as the concurrent act of the grantor in making the 
Warranty Deed as Trustee. Such is an explanation of 
the status of the title. With two inactive corporations the 
difficulties were obvious and this does constitute evi-
dence of "other title transactions" as contemplated by 
the Statute and by the Standards. 
Appellants contend that the plaintiff must rely on 
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the strength of his own title and not the weakess of the 
tax title of the defendants. The decision of Olsen v. Park 
Daughters is cited to fortify this legal proposition, 29 
Utah 2d 421, 511 P.2d, 145. This legalism was stated in 
that case but was merely as an aside, as the case was 
decided on the issue of Marketable Record Title Act vs. 
boundary by acquiesence. Mr. Olsen had an unbroken 
chain of title running back to a root of title more than 40 
years old (1886). However, the channel of the Provo 
River and a fence along the west bank had apparently 
been the boundary line acquiesced in for over 50 years. 
The boundary by acquiescence theory won. 
This Olsen v. Park case stands for the legal princi-
ple that the Marketable Record Title Act did not apply 
"to defeat the more fundamental boundary by acquie-
scence as established in defendants." If we consider the 
"quality of title" required to prevail in a case, we should 
remember that in boundary by acquiescence cases such 
as Olsen and others, the prevailing party has no fee title 
and no root or chain of title. Thus, in order for your 
Court to find the issues in favor of Mr. Colman in the 
present case as against the defendants, no actual estab-
lished chain of title is required. 
Has Utah always required a plaintiff to have a 
marketable title to be a successful plaintiff? The answer 
must be in the negative. Boundaries by acquiescence are 
one example. In an Occupying Claimant proceeding, 
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one merely needs -"color of title" (see Section 57-6-4 
U.GA. 1953). , 
The Olsen case cited (supra) is the most recent 
Utah decision known to us on the Marketable Record 
Title Act. Part of the decision reads: 
"The Marketable Record Title Act has for its 
purpose encouraging repose and discouraging a 
controversy by providing for elimination of an-
cient defects in title." 
This is consistent with plaintiff's purpose in this 
proceeding. The fee title is in plaintiff and such can be 
adjudicated by this Court. The transition from the com-
panies who took title in 1916 to Mr. Colman, through 
Mr. Banks, Trustee, may not be in ideal documentation, 
but as against the defendant and the world, none can 
assert a better, prior or superior title. Appellants are 
critical of Mr. Banks and challenge his position as a 
Trustee. This is immaterial to them. They are not stock-
holders in either corporation and have absolutely no 
privity with them or Mr. Banks. Prima facie evidence 
of title has been adduced before the court sufficient to 
sustain the affirmative Decree quieting title in plaintiff. 
In turn, we challenge the position of Appellants in 
attempting to attack plaintiff's title in this proceeding. 
We have discussed above in detail the void nature of the 
defendants' tax deed from Summit County because of 
the fatal inadequacy of the description. A recent word 
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from, your Court on tax titles, Huntington City v. C. 
W. Peterson, 30 Utah 2d. 407, 518 P.2d 1246 said in 
part: 
"Before the holder of a tax deed can deprive 
the record owner of land, the burden is upon him 
to establish his title by showing that the tax and 
all proceedings in connection therewith were 
strictly according to the statute." (p. 1249) 
Thus, we reaffirm that the burden is on Butkovich in 
this case. The title to this property came out of the 
United States by patent during the 19th Century and is 
now vested in someone. We believe it is in the plaintiff -
obviously, not in the defendants. Sections 78-12-1 and 
78-12-7.1 U.C.A. as amended, say that in a quiet title 
proceeding, "the person establishing legal title to such 
property shall be presumed to have been possessed 
thereof within the time required by law; . . . " 
CONCLUSION 
The stability of titles to real property is a desirable 
end to be achieved. I t is abundantly clear that the ap-
pellants cannot sustain and have not proven any title to 
the realty here involved. The purported tax deeds from 
Summit Couty were fatally defective as to this property. 
No portion of this property was conveyed thereby to 
the Butkovichs. 
The trial Court has found that Plaintiff had "color 
of title" within the requirements of the law. Both the 
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Marketable Record Act and the Utah Bar Title Stand-
ards sustain such a finding and the Decree quieting title 
in the Plaintiff. We respectfully urge that this decision 
be affirmed by your Court. The great care exercised by 
the trial court is deserving of affirmation and application 
of the presumptions of propriety customarily followed 
by your Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H A R R Y D P U G S L E Y 
N E D WARNOCK 
22 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY 
DEC 6 1975 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
J. Reuben Clark Law School 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
